Private you can check.
Most apps say "encrypted" and ask you to trust them. This page says how Jog's keys work, what that stops, what it doesn't, and every network request the app makes.
This is the design as built so far. The full write-up, with the source of the crypto code and an open invitation to break it, publishes with the public beta.
What's stored, and how
- Video of the screen is cut into chunks of a few minutes. Each chunk is encrypted in memory with its own random 256-bit key (AES-GCM) before anything is written. Unencrypted video never touches the disk.
- Text, app names, window titles and web addresses go into a database encrypted with SQLCipher (AES-256).
- Everything is in one folder, left out of Time Machine by default.
- The master key lives in the macOS data-protection Keychain, readable only on this Mac after you've logged in once, and never synced to iCloud.
- The database key and a wrapping key are derived from it with HKDF-SHA256.
- Each chunk key is wrapped (AES key wrap) and stored next to the chunk's record. Retention deletes the wrapped key along with the chunk.
- Opening your history asks for Touch ID, your Apple Watch or your password, and locks again when the screen locks.
Plainly: in the first beta, the Touch ID prompt is a gate in the app, not part of the encryption. Recording has to keep running while you're away, so the app holds the keys while you're logged in. The encryption protects a copied folder, a stolen backup or another user account. It does not protect against malware already running as you. A later version wraps chunk keys to a key that only unlocks with Touch ID; it will be described here before it ships.
Threat model
| Threat | Defence | What it doesn't stop |
|---|---|---|
| Someone opens your unlocked Mac and browses your history | Touch ID or password before the history shows | Them watching your live screen |
| Another app, a backup or a thief copies the data folder | Encryption at rest; keys stay in this Mac's Keychain | Malware already running as you with Keychain access |
| Passwords and API keys end up in the search index | Password managers and password fields are never captured; known key formats (AWS, Stripe, GitHub, JWT, private keys) are replaced with [secret] before indexing | Secrets visible in stored video frames; blurring comes later |
| A web page you looked at contains instructions aimed at Ask | Screen text is treated as data. Ask can only run read-only searches; it can't change, send or delete anything | A misleading answer, which the cited times let you check |
Never captured
- Password managers, matched by app.
- Private and incognito browser windows.
- Password fields, and anything typed while macOS secure input is on.
- Jog's own windows.
- Any app you add to the list.
These are left out by macOS before the frame reaches Jog, not blurred or deleted afterwards. If Jog can't tell whether a browser window is private, it skips the window.
Every network request
| Request | When | What it sends |
|---|---|---|
| Update check | Once a day, or when you ask | App version and macOS version |
| Licence check | Paid plans only, about once a week | Your licence key |
That's the whole list. Ask runs on Apple's on-device model, not a server. Nothing you've seen is ever in a request. Check it with LuLu or Little Snitch.
Break it
If you find a way to read someone's Jog history that this page says shouldn't work, please report it. A security contact and the rules for reporting publish with the beta.